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DECLARATIONS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST:
WHAT MUST BE CORROBORATED UNDER
THE NEWLY ENACTED FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE, RULE 804(b)(3)?
INTRODUCTION
Defendant is accused of the larceny of a vase. Outside of court,
Smith declares that he and not the defendant stole the vase. Subse-
quent to this declaration, Smith dies. At the defendant's trial, his
counsel seeks to admit testimony of Smith's declaration in an at-
tempt to exculpate the defendant. But the prosecution raises the
objection that the out-of-court declaration is hearsay' and therefore
inadmissible. Defense counsel will reply that Smith's out-of-court
declaration against penal interest' comes within the exception to the
hearsay rule admitting declarations against interest.
The traditional statement of the declaration against interest
exception3 permits introduction of hearsay declarations upon the
satisfaction of certain criteria: (1) that the declarant is not a party
1. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) where the Court stated:
The hearsay rule, which has long been recognized and respected by virtually every
state, is based on experience and grounded in the notion that untrustworthy evidence
should not be presented to the triers of fact. Out-of-court statements are traditionally
excluded because they lack the conventional indicia of reliability: they are usually
not made under oath or circumstances that impress the speaker with the solemnity
of his statements; the declarant's word is not subject to cross-examination; and he
is not available in order that his demeanor and credibility may be assessed by the
jury.
Id. at 158; accord, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973).
2. A statement is against penal interest when it may subject the declarant to criminal
prosecution. The threat of incarceration is a deterrent to the making of such statements. By
jeopardizing liberty, the statement is clearly against the declarant's interest. So the assump-
tion is that one would not make such a potentially harmful statement unless he knew the
facts asserted to be true.
3. Alexander Grants' Sons v. Phoenix Assurance Co., 25 App. Div. 2d 93, 95, 267
N.Y.S.2d 220, 222-23 (1966); G.M. McKelvey Co. v. General Gas Co. of America, 2 Ohio Op.
2d 345, 347, 142 N.E.2d 854, 855-56 (Sup. Ct. 1957); C. McCoR mcK, LAw OF EvmENca §§ 276-
80 (2d ed. 1972); J. RiCHARDSON, LAw OF EvmizNCE 230-31 (9th ed. 1964); 5 J. WiOMoRE,
EvIDENCE §§ 1455-77 (3d ed. 1940); Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception to
the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1944); Morgan, Declarations Against Interest, 5 VAmD.
L. REv. 451 (1952); Morgan, Declarations Against Interest in Texas, 10 TEx. L. Rzv. 399
(1932). See also E. MoRGAN, BAsic PRoBLEMs oF EvmENcE 290 (1961) (listing possible additions
to criteria); Note, Evidence-Declaration Against Penal Interest, 24 ARK. L. Rzv. 567 (1971)
(asserting additional requirements that declarant have no motive to falsify). But the latter
view seems incorrect on the ground that motive to falsify is already contained in the determi-
nation of whether the statement is against interest.
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to the action4 and is now unavailable;5 (2) that the statement con-
tains facts immediately and substantially prejudicial to the declar-
ant's proprietary or pecuniary interest;' and (3) that the declarant
knew the statement to be contrary to his interest when he made it.7
Under this traditional rule, Smith's out-of-court declaration would
not be admissible on the ground that it was against his penal inter-
est and not against any pecuniary or proprietary interest. However,
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 804(b)(3), Smith's decla-
ration against penal interest would be admissible if corroborated.'
The federal rule neither defines what needs to be corroborated
nor describes which corroborating circumstances insure admissibil-
4. There are crucial distinctions between party admissions and declarations against
interest. An admission is primary evidence receivable even though the declarant is available;
it need not be against interest when made; and it is made either by a party opponent or one
in privity with the party opponent. Dissimilarly, a declaration against interest is secondary
evidence; it is receivable, under the traditional view, only where the declarant is unavailable;
and it must be against the declarant's interest at the time it was made. C. McCoRmiCK, supra
note 2, at § 276; 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 217 (1964).
5. Originally only the death of the declarant qualified for purposes of unavailability.
Later in the common law development, absence from the jurisdiction qualified. Now the trend
is to recognize the privilege against self-incrimination as meeting the unavailability require-
ment. See 5 J. WIGMoRE, supra note 3, at § 1456; Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest:
An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, supra note 3, at 6-8; Morgan, Declarations Against
Interest, 5 VAND. L. REv. 451, 475 (1952); Comment, Evidence: The Unavailability Require-
ment of Declaration Against Interest Hearsay, 55 IA. L. REv. 477 (1969); 31A C.J.S. Evidence
§ 218 (1964).
6. See note 2 supra.
7. There are two general rationales upon which trustworthiness of declarations against
interest may be predicated. One is that if the underlying facts of the declaration will cause
the declarant substantial harm, it is unlikely that he will concede or admit their existence
unless they are true. Under the rather theoretical second rationale, if the statement itself is
contrary to the declarant's interest it is improbable that he would consciously make such an
unfavorable statement falsely. Wigmore and Morgan reject the latter, observing that a declar-
ant rarely conceives of making evidence against himself. 5 WiGMORE, supra note 3, at § 1462;
Morgan, Declarations Against Interest, 5 VAND. L. REv. 451, 454-55 (1952); accord, MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 509, Comment c (1942).
8. Rule 804. Hearsay Exceptions: Declarant Unavailable . . . (b) Hearsay ex-
ceptions.-The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is
unavailable as a witness: . . . (3) statements against interest.-A statement which
was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprie-
tary interest, or so far tended to subject him to . . . criminal liability . . . that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed
it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and
offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement.
FED. R. EvID., Pub. L. No. 93-595, art. 8 (Jan. 2, 1975) [hereinafter cited as rule 804(b)(3)].
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ity. The purpose of this note is to assist trial judges and attorneys
in the application of the corroboration requirement of rule
804(b)(3). In furtherance of this objective, the historical develop-
ment of admissibility of declarations against penal interest is
traced. To facilitate understanding of the penal interest and corro-
boration aspects of rule 804(b)(3), the reasons both for and against
the traditional rule excluding statements contrary to penal interest
are examined. The rationale and policy behind each of the three
main trends in this area-(1) traditional rule of exclusion, (2) liberal
view of admissibility, and (3) admissibility only where special cir-
cumstances are found-are analyzed and related to the corrobora-
tion requirement of the federal rule. Thus far, no writer has catego-
rized the various approaches to the special-circumstances trend.
Such a study is undertaken in this note. Upon analysis, five distinct
approaches to the special-circumstances trend emerge. This study
and categorization are crucial both to a complete historical perspec-
tive of declarations against penal interest and to lay foundation for
analogies to the corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3).
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ADMISSIBILITY OF DECLARATIONS AGAINST
PENAL INTEREST
The rule which excludes statements against the declarant's
penal interest' was first established in England in the Sussex
Perrage case.10 This view was adopted in the United States as the
majority rule in both federal" and state jurisdictions. 2 An examina-
tion of the debate surrounding the rule will provide an understand-
ing of the penal interest aspect of rule 804(b)(3) and suggest reasons
for its corroboration requirement.
9. See 5 J. WIGMOREW supra note 3, at § 1476 (tracing origins, noting a disregard of prior
precedent by the English courts, and criticizing the limitation to pecuniary and proprietary
interests).
10. 11 Cl. & F. 85, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034 (1844) (rejecting declarations by an unavailable.
clergyman that he had performed a certain marriage, a fact which would subject him to
criminal prosecution).
11. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243, rehearing denied, 228 U.S. 708 (1913);
Scolari v. United States, 406 F.2d 563 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 981 (1969).
12. Annot., 35 A.LR. 441 (1923); Annot., 48 A.L.R. 348 (1926); 20 Am. Jui. Evidence
§ 495 (1939); 22A C.J.A. Criminal Law § 749 (1964).
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Reasons For and Against Admissibility of Declarations Against
Penal Interest
Courts have justified the exclusion of statements against penal
interest for a variety of reasons. First, such declarations are hearsay,
fitting no recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Early in the
history of the Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall warned:
[Tihe danger of admitting hearsay evidence is sufficient
to admonish courts of justice against lightly yielding to the
introduction of fresh exceptions to an old and well estab-
lished rule, the value of which is felt and acknowledged by
all. 3
One hundred years after Chief Justice Marshall's admonition, the
Court excluded the declaration of a third party which may have
exculpated the defendant of murder liability. Relying on the tradi-
tional hearsay objection, the Court reasoned that (a) the jury had
no opportunity to observe the demeanor of the out-of-court declar-
ant, (b) there was no opportunity for cross examination either at the
time the statement was made or at the time of the trial, since the
declarant was unavailable, and (c) the declarant was not under oath
when he made the statement. 14
A second justification for the exclusion of declarations against
penal interest is the fear of perjured testimony by witnesses or false
confessions by third-party declarants.
Everyone accused of crime would be tempted to introduce
perjured testimony concerning statements of some third
person, then beyond the jurisdiction of the court, admitting
that such third person and not the defendant, had commit-
ted the crime in question, and the experience of courts ren-
ders it certain that many would yield to such a tempta-
tion. 5
13. Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (1 Cranch) 290 (1813) (discussing hearsay rule in gen-
eral).
14. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913); accord, Brown v. State, 99 Miss.
719, 727-28, 55 So. 961, 962 (1911).
15. Brennan v. State, 151 Md. 265, 134 A. 148, 150 (1926); accord, Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); Lyon v. State, 22 Ga. 399 (1857); Munshower v. State, 55 Md. 11
(1880); Davis v. State, 8 Okla. Crim. 515, 128 P. 1097 (1913); Comment, The Admission Into
[Vol. 9
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Numerous illustrations showing the reality of this suspicion can be
found in case law. For example, in Commonwealth v. Wakelin,11 the
defendant offered into evidence, surprisingly without objection, the
declaration of a man named Ducharme to the effect that he, and not
the defendant, had committed the murder. At the time Ducharme
made the declaration, he was awaiting execution at the state prison.
Thus, he knew before he made the incriminating declaration that
he would not be available for further prosecution. Similarly, in
McCoslin v. State,7 the defendant offered a declaration of an al-
leged accomplice in which the accomplice stated that he alone com-
mitted the crime with which the defendant was charged. The ac-
complice, however, was not subject to the deterrent effect of addi-
tional prosecution since he would suffer the same amount of punish-
ment whether committing the crime alone or in conjunction with
the defendant."8
The Supreme Court has recently noted that declarations of
criminal activity are often motivated by extraneous considerations
and, therefore, are not as inherently reliable as statements against
pecuniary or proprietary interest." Although motive to falsify may
render the declaration not against interest, actual detection of such
motive is often difficult. Motives for falsification may vary from a
desire to exculpate a friend to a desire to frustrate the criminal
processes. In addition, the unavailability of the declarant fosters the
suspicion that both his declaration and absence from prosecution
are part of a scheme to falsify. Since a defendant in a criminal
prosecution need raise only a reasonable doubt, courts may under-
standably fear that easily perjured testimony or false declarations
Evidence of Extra-Judicial Confession of Guilt Made By Third Parties, 23 MD. L. Rzv. 178
(1963).
16. 230 Mass. 567, 120 N.E. 209 (1918).
17. 96 Tex. Crim. 175, 256 S.W. 294 (1923).
18. Contra, People v. Riccardi, 40 App. Div. 1083, 338 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1972), cert. denied
94 S.Ct. 47 (1974) (declarant's statement not against penal interest where, prior to his execu-
tion, he was not subject to the deterrent effect of potential prosecution). See also United
States v. Dovico, 261 F. Supp. 862 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), affd 380 F.2d 325 (2d Cir.), cert. denied
389 U.S. 944 (1967) (declaration not against penal interest where declarant already serving
sentence for same occurrence). Where the declarant knows that he will not be available for
criminal prosecution, the deterrent effect of potential criminal sanctions does not insure
trustworthiness. The declaration is theoretically against penal interest, but the underlying
rationale for the exception does not apply. Thus, the evidence should be inadmissible.
19. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
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will exculpate a guilty party. The crux of this reasoning is the con-
cept of an inherent lack of trustworthiness in the truth of the decla-
ration.20
Additional but less persuasive reasons have been submitted for
the exclusion of statements against penal interest. Admissibility
may lead to investigation of collateral matters and divert the jury
from the real issue to be determined by it." The rule may be the
remnant of a day when courts were more distrustful of juries and
more prone to construe the law harshly against the person accused
of the crime." Or finally, the declaration, if true, would render the
declarant morally incompetent as a witness."
The preceding objections have traditionally resulted in exclu-
sion of declarations against penal interest. Although rule 804(b)(3)
admits such declarations, these objections suggest reasons for its
corroboration requirement.
On the other hand, several arguments have been advanced for
the abandonment of the rule which excludes declarations against
penal interest. To say the evidence is inadmissible merely because
it is hearsay, begs the question. The better approach is to ask
whether the rationale behind other hearsay exceptions-need and
trustworthiness-applies to statements against penal interest.2' The
fact that the declaration is against interest guarantees its trustwor-
thiness. The declarant's unavailability creates a need for the
second-hand evidence.
In addition, strict adherence to the traditional hearsay limita-
tion ignores the underlying rationale of the declaration-against-
interest exception. The broad language of this rationale- the aver-
20. C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 255 (1954); 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at
§§ 1476-77, Morgan, Declarations Against Interest, 5 VAND. L. REv. 451, 475 (1952).
21. Seibert v. State, 133 Md. 309, 314, 105 A. 161, 163 (1918); State v. Fletcher, 240
Or. 295, 33 P. 575 (1893).
22. Annot., 35 A.L.R. 445 (1923).
23. Fonville v. Atlanta & C. Air Line Ry. Co., 93 S.C. 287, 75 S.E. 172, rehearing denied,
93 S.C. 295, 76 S.E. 615 (1912); Tom Love Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 166 Tenn. 275, 61
S.W.2d 672 (1933); Sible v. State, 3 Heisk (Tenn.) 137 (1871). See also Heydon, The Corrobor-
ation of Accomplices, 1973 CRaM. L. REP. 264-65 (noting old view where corroboration required
in accomplice context due to self-declared moral and criminal guilt).
24. Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923); 5 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 3, at § 1457.
[Vol. 9
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age person will not concede even to himself the existence of a fact
contrary to his interest unless he knows it to exist-would logically
include declarations against penal interest as well as those against
pecuniary or proprietary interest. As a result, the distinction be-
tween declarations against penal interest and those against pecuni-
ary or proprietary is illogical. In effect, the traditional limitation
relegates the loss of one's liberty secondary to the loss of one's
money or land. That is, statements jeopardizing one's money or land
are considered inherently more trustworthy than those statements
which jeopardize one's liberty. The patent absurdity of this idea 5
was noted by Judge Bergan of the New York Court of Appeals:
The distinction which would authorize a court to receive
proof that a man admitted he never had title to an Elgin
watch, but not to receive proof that he had admitted strik-
ing Jones over the head with a club, assuming the equal
relevancy of both statements, does not readily withstand
analysis."6
Another reason in favor of admissibility of declarations against
penal interest is a reply to the fear-of-perjury objection:" the possi-
bility of perjury and falsification is present in all cases. The truth
of the declaration itself and the credibility of the witness who under-
takes to repeat the declaration, like the truthfulness of other testi-
mony, must address itself to and be settled by the jury rather than
being an issue of admissibility.
Finally, the concept of justice in our American courts2 man-
dates admissibility of declarations against the penal interest of a
third party which tend to exculpate the accused. It is better to risk
letting a guilty man go free rather than to convict an innocent one.
The fear of diverting the jury to collateral matters, the anachronistic
25. See People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 845, 389 P.2d 377, 381
(1964); In re Wininger's Petition, 337 P.2d 445, 454 (Okla. Crim. 1959) (dissent); 5 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 3, at § 1476; Morgan, Declarations Against Interest in Texas, 10 Tax.
L. REV. 399 (1932); Note, Evidence: Declarations Against Penal Interest-A Plea For Parity,
5 TuLSA L.J. 302, 313 (1968). See also 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 3, at §§ 1420-22.
26. People v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 90, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827, 257 N.E.2d 16,17 (1970).
27. Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923); 5 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 3, at § 1477.
28. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting); 5 J. WIn-
MORE, supra note 3, at § 1477.
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idea that a person admitting criminal guilt is morally incompetent
to give testimony, and the prior tendency to construe the law
harshly against the accused all fail to take account of the need for
admissibility in the interests of justice.
Approaches Which Admit Declarations Against Penal Interest
The debate on whether to admit declarations against penal
interest has resulted in several approaches to the problem. Some
courts have reaffirmed but circumvented the rule of exclusion by
finding that a particular declaration was against both penal and
pecuniary interest, admitting the evidence on the latter ground.2
Two other trends in the law openly reject the hearsay limitation on
statements against penal interest. Each has its own distinct policy
reasons. The more liberal view extends the rationale behind declara-
tions against interest to its logical limit. The evidence is admitted
because it is against the declarant's interest, and this fact per se
suffices as a substitute for cross-examination and guarantees its
inherent trustworthiness30
29. E.g., Weber v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co., 175 Iowa 358, 151 N.W. 852 (1915)
(declaration that third party had unbolted rail causing derailment of train was against both
penal and pecuniary interests, but admissible on the latter ground).
30. Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243 (1913) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Mason v.
United States, 257 F.2d 359 (10th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 831 (1959) (defendant
failed to show that the out-of-court statement was voluntary and against the penal interest
of the declarant, but dicta to the effect that statements against penal interest per se are
admissible); United States v. Miller, 277 F. Supp. 200 (D. Conn. 1967) (willingness to reconsi-
der old rule in light of shifting weight of authority); Deike v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 3 Ariz.
430, 415 P.2d 145 (1966) (dicta); Pollock v. Sup. Ct. for L.A. Cty., 272 Cal. 2d 548, 77 Cal.
Rptr. 565 (C.A.2d Dist. Div. 5 1969); People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 389 P.2d 377, 381, 36
Cal. Rptr. 841, 845 (1964) ("... a person's interest against being criminally implicated gives
reasonable assurance of the veracity of his statement against that interest."); State v. Leong,
51 Haw. 581, 465 P.2d 560 (1970); People v. Archibald, 129 M1. 2d 400, 263 N.E.2d 711 (1970);
State v. Parrish, 205 Kan. 178, 468 P.2d 143 (1970) (based on statute, K.S.A. 60-460(j)); State
v. O'Clair, 292 A.2d 186 (Me. 1972) (statement not against penal interest, but court willing
to review old rule); Osbourne v. Purdom, 250 S.W.2d 159 (Mo. 1952); Sutter v. Easterly, 354
Mo. 282, 189 S.W.2d 284 (1945) (admissibility expressly limited to civil cases by the subse-
quent decision in State v. Brown, 404 S.W.2d 179 (Mo. 1966)); Goff v. State, 496 P.2d 160
(Nev. 1962) (based on Nevada statute, N.R.S. 51.345(1)); Band Refuse Removal v. Fair
Lawn, 62 N.J. 552, 163 A.2d 465 (1960) (Appellate Division of New Jersey Superior Court
affirming trial judge's admission of declaration against penal interest, and noting the New
Jersey Proposed Rule of Evidence 63(10) would make such declaration admissible); People
v. Brown, 26 N.Y.2d 88, 257 N.E.2d 16, 308 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1970); State v. Sanders, 27 Utah
2d 354, 496 P.2d 270 (1972) (based on Utah statute, 63(10)); WEsT's ANN. CAL. EvmENcE CODE,
§ 1230; NEw Jamnsa EvrDENcE RuLE 63(10); MODEL CODE OF EvmENcE rule 509 (1942); UNIoiM
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 5
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The more conservative view which rejects the hearsay limita-
tion is the special-circumstances trend.3 Under this approach, a
trial judge may admit declarations against penal interest where
circumstances insure a special need and/or special trustworthiness.
Although the special-circumstances cases are relatively few in num-
ber, a study of this trend reveals that five separate jurisdictional
prerequisites to admissibility have developed. Each employs a
balancing-of-interest test. On one side is the danger of fabrication
and the possibility of freeing a guilty man. On the other side is the
need for such evidence in order to prevent injustice to an innocent
man and the circumstances insuring a trustworthiness necessary to
preserve jury integrity. A preliminary categorization of these five
approaches to admissibility demonstrates the various jurisdictional
emphases placed on need and/or trustworthiness: (1) Texas rule:
circumstances showing both special need and special trustworthi-
ness; (2) Maryland rule: circumstances showing either special need
or special trustworthiness; (3) Illinois rule: emphasis primarily on
need; (4) Virginia rule: emphasis primarily on trustworthiness; and
(5) strict application of Virginia rule: trustworthiness in fact. The
five approaches to special circumstances differ only in the amount
of weight given to need and/or trustworthiness.
The methodology used by this writer to categorize these ap-
proaches is first to isolate the special circumstances of each particu-
lar case. Then an inquiry is made into whether the circumstances
insure special need for the evidence or whether the circumstances
insure special trustworthiness of the facts underlying the declara-
tion. For instance, a court may admit a declaration against penal
interest where the special circumstances are the following: the de-
CODE OF EvmIENc rule 63(10) (1965); C. McCORMICK, supra note 3, at § 278; 5 J. WioMoRE,
supra note 3, at § 1477 (labelling the traditional rule a "barbarous" doctrine); 22A C.J.S.
Criminal Law § 749 (1964). See also United States v. Dovico, 380 F.2d 325 (2d Cir. 1967);
United States v. Annunziato, 293 F.2d 373 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 919 (1961).
31. See Masons' Fraternal Acci. Assoc. v. Riley, 65 Ark. 261, 45 S.W. 684 (1898) (appar-
ently limited to civil cases); State v. Larsen, 91 Idaho 42, 415 P.2d 685 (1966); People v.
Lettrich, 413 I1. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952); Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961),
aff'd 373 U.S. 83 (1963); Thomas v. State, 186 Md. 446, 47 A.2d 43 (1946); Brennan v. State,
151 Md. 265, 134 A. 148'(1926); In re Wininger's Petition, 337 P.2d 445 (Okla. Crim. 1959)
(dissent); State v. Fletcher, 24 Or. 295, 33 P. 575 (1893) (dictum); Cameron v. State, 153 Tex.
Crim. 636, 141 S.W.2d 654 (1940); Wise v. State, 101 Tex.Crim. 58, 273 S.W. 850 (1925);
Newburry v. Commonwealth, 191 Va. 445, 61 S.E.2d 318 (1950); Hines v. Commonwealth,
136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
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fendant alleges that his confession was coerced; the defendant's con-
fession is substantially the only evidence against him; and the de-
fendant's confession does not coincide with many of the known facts
surrounding the crime. The effect of these circumstances is to cast
doubt on the veracity of the defendant's confession and ultimate
guilt. There is an obvious risk of convicting an innocent man. Thus,
justice creates a special need for additional evidence. For purposes
of admissibility, the court in no way focuses on the truthfulness of
the facts underlying the third party's declaration against penal in-
terest. Alternatively, a court may admit declarations against penal
interest where the circumstances show a special trustworthiness of
the declaration. For example, circumstances showing the declar-
ant's opportunity to commit the crime increase the probability that
the facts underlying the declarant's statement are actually true. In
this latter example, the emphasis is on the trustworthiness of the
facts asserted in the declarant's statement, not on the need to pre-
vent injustice to the defendant. The methodology has a dual pur-
pose. It provides a basis for understanding the approaches to the
special-circumstances trend, and it lays foundation for analogies to
the corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3).
ANALOGY BETWEEN THE CORROBORATION REQUIREMENT OF RULE
804(b)(3) AND SELECTED JURISDICTIONAL APPROACHES TO THE SPECIAL
CIRCUMSTANCES TREND
Both the 1969 Preliminary Draft and the 1971 Revised Draft of
rule 804(b) (3) incorporated the liberal view of admissibility of decla-
rations against penal interest. Extending to its logical limit the
rationale behind the declaration-against-interest exception to the
hearsay rule, the drafters of the proposed federal rules found no need
for a corroboration requirement. However, the corroboration prere-
quisite was ultimately added in the rules adopted by the Court in
1972 as a compromise with those who believed that the circumstan-
ces surrounding declarations against penal interest were such as to
create a high probability of fabrication.2
There is no reported case law which speaks in terms of corrobor-
32. Letter from Professor Edward W. Cleary, Professor of Law at Arizona State Uni-
versity and reporter for the Federal Rules of Evidence, to the Valparaiso Law Review, Oct.
25, 1974, on file in Valparaiso Law Library.
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ation of third-party declarations against penal interest. Nonethe-
less, rule 804(b)(3) can easily be analogized to the special-
circumstances trend. This trend, like the corroboration requirement
of rule 804(b)(3), is a compromise between the traditional rule
which assumes an inherent unreliability and the liberal view which
assumes the opposite-that the statement is in fact inherently
trustworthy. Both the special-circumstances trend and the federal
rule admit declarations against penal interest after a showing of
special or corroborating circumstances. This fact indicates that both
approaches still retain the traditional idea that a declaration
against penal interest is inherently untrustworthy. Otherwise, there
would be no need for a showing of special or corroborating circum-
stances in addition to the fact that the statement is against interest.
But a closer look at the corroboration requirement of rule
804(b) (3) reveals that it is narrower in application than some of the
special-circumstances approaches. The distinguishing feature of the
rule is that it assumes an inherent need for this second-hand evi-
dence. The language of the federal rule requires that the evidence
tend "to exculpate the accused." This may be resolved by a simple
inquiry. If true, would the declarant's statement exonerate the de-
fendant? If the answer is affirmative, the express purpose for admis-
sibility has been satisfied. There is no further requirement that the
circumstances corroborate a need for the evidence. Notably, the
official comments to rule 804(b)(3) state that "the requirement of
corroboration should be construed in such a manner as to effectuate
its purpose of circumventing fabrication."3 The exclusive reason for
corroboration, as stated by the official comments, is to insure the
trustworthiness of the facts underlying the declaration. No mention
is made of requiring circumstances corroborative of special need for
the evidence.35 Consequently, those approaches to the special-
circumstances trend which focus on circumstances requiring a spe-
cial need for the evidence are not analogous to rule 804(b)(3). How-
33. See note 8 supra.
34. RutEs OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED STATES COURTS AND MAGSTRATES 137 (West 1973)
(citation is to the comments of the proposed federal rules of evidence, since the official
comments to the newly enacted federal rules are unavailable at the time of publication of
this note).
35. It can also be argued that operation of rule 804(b)(3) assumes an inherent need for
the second-hand evidence. That is, the rule operates to admit evidence which was formerly
inadmissible. Without an inherent need, the evidence would be totally excluded.
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ever, those cases which require circumstances demonstrating a spe-
cial trustworthiness will be of substantial value as precedent for the
application of the federal rule.
EXAMINATION OF THE FIvE APPROACHES TO THE SPECIAL-CIRCUMSTANCES
TREND
Texas Rule: Circumstances Showing Both Special Need and Special
Trustworthiness
Texas courts admit declarations against penal interest when
three criteria are satisfied. First, there must be a risk of convicting
an innocent man.37 Thus, where the prosecution relies on circum-
stantial evidence and no direct evidence, the needs of justice require
the admission of the evidenceYs Second, the declaration if true must
exculpate the accused.3 Third, the person making the declaration
must have been so situated that he might have committed the
crime.4
A comparison of this test to rule 804(b)(3) reveals that the first
two criteria are not analogous to the corroboration requirement. The
first criterion of the Texas rule requires circumstances showing a
need for the evidence. Rule 804(b)(3) obviates corroboration of this
by assuming an inherent need. The second criterion goes to the
purpose for which the evidence is offered. Similarly the federal rule
requires that the evidence be exculpatory in nature. This require-
ment is not concerned with corroboration, but rather, with an initial
36. Until the federal rules of evidence became law on January 2, 1975, the federal
jurisdictions had been bound by the precedent of Donnelly v. United States, 228 U.S. 243
(1913). As a result, the special-circumstasces trend is composed of state cases. This fact
should not lessen their value as guidelines for application of the federal rule. Since the rule
neither defines what needs to be corroborated nor describes what circumstances insure admis-
sibility, a general analogy based on sameness of policy and underlying rationale should
withstand scrutiny.
37. Cameron v. State, 153 Tex. Crim. 29, 217 S.W.2d 23 (1949); Morris v. State, 131
Tex. Crim. 338, 98 S.W.2d 200 (1936); Wise v. State, 101 Tex. Crim. 58, 273 S.W. 850 (1925);
Stone v. State, 98 Tex. Crim. 364, 265 S.W. 900 (1924). See also Morgan, Declarations Against
Interest in Texas, 10 TEx. L. Rzv. 399 (1932).
38. The need for such evidence-the threat of losing it entirely at the risk of convicting
an innocent man-is lessened where there is direct or compelling evidence indicating the guilt
of the accused. Of course, the defendant may need the evidence more than otherwise, but
the risk of convicting an innocent man is minimized.
39. See note 37 supra.
40. See note 37 supra.
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inquiry by the court whether the evidence would exculpate the de-
fendant.
The third criterion of the Texas rule is analogous to the corro-
boration requirement. The purpose of both the third criterion and
the federal rule is to insure the trustworthiness of the facts asserted
within the declaration. Circumstances showing the declarant's op-
portunity to commit the crime increase the probability that the
facts underlying the declarant's statement are actually true. By
analogy to this third criterion, a showing that the declarant had an
opportunity to commit the crime asserted within his declaration
would suffice as meeting the corroboration requirement of rule
804(b)(3).
Maryland Rule: Circumstances Showing Either Special Need or
Special Trustworthiness
In 1880, Maryland followed the majority rule, excluding state-
ments against the declarant's penal interest.0 But an exception to
the traditional rule was recognized in Brennan v. State,1 a bastardy
case where the defendant sought to prove his innocence by estab-
lishing the paternity of a third-party declarant. The special circum-
stances were that the declaration of paternity was contained in a
letter in the handwriting of the declarant; that the declarant, a
married man, committed suicide on the very day of the birth of the
illegitimate child; that the testimony regarding its contents, the
letter having been lost, was to come from the declarant's sister; and
that the proferred testimony would be to the effect that the declar-
ant committed suicide for the sole reason of his paternity. Noting
that the witness had no motive to falsify and that the declarant's
acts subsequent to the crime indicated that a reasonable man would
not act in such a manner unless he committed the crime, the
Brennan court said:
Men do not commit suicide in order to assist a rival and
comparative stranger to defend a bastardy charge, nor
would the relatives of a suicide in such cases as this ordinar-
41. Munshower v State, 55 Md. 11 (1880); Comment, The Admission Into Evidence of
Extra-Judicial Confession of Guilt Made By Third Parties, 23 MD. L. Rsv. 178 (1963).
42. 151 Md. 265, 134 A. 148 (1926).
et al.: Declarations Against Penal Interest: What Must Be Corroborated Un
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1975
434 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ily conspire with his rival to perjure themselves in his de-
fense. 3
Thus, the Brennan case emphasizes the particular reliability of the
facts underlying the declaration as a condition precedent to admis-
sibility.
Twenty years later in Thomas v. State," the Maryland Court
of Appeals again applied a special-circumstances approach. In
Thomas, the officer investigating the crime had been so diligent in
investigating the murder that he obtained confessions from both the
defendant and a third party. Noting that the declarant's statement
if true would be inconsistent with the defendant's guilt, the court
formulated the following three rules of admissibility:'- (1) where a
witness has made a written confession that he committed the crime
with which the defendant is charged, the defendant should be al-
lowed to introduce the confession in evidence and question him
concerning the confession and the circumstances under which it was
made; (2) where an officer has secured contradictory confessions
from two different persons, the defense should be permitted to ques-
tion the officer about both confessions; and (3) a confession by a
third party is admissible unless it appears that there was some
collusion in obtaining it."
Actually, the third requirement of absence of collusion is not an
independent criterion, but rather, a part of the initial determination
of whether the statement is in fact against interest. Read as a whole,
the special circumstances of the Thomas case-two conflicting con-
fessions-focus on the need for admissibility. The reason to disbe-
lieve the defendant's guilt is greater where there are two conflicting
confessions. And, discounting patently false confessions by third
persons, the risk of convicting an innocent man is greater. Thus,
43. Id. at 272, 134 A. at 151. See Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest: An Exception
to the Hearsay Rule, supra note 3 at 42 (asserting that this would not be a declaration against
interest since the declarant would not expect to be subject to prosecution and punishment).
44. 186 Md. 446, 47 A.2d 43 (1946).
45. Id. at 452, 47 A.2d at 46.-
46. In Thomas, the defendant's second-degree murder conviction was reversed and
remanded on other grounds. So the Thomas rules were merely dicta until specifically applied
in Brady v. State, 226 Md. 422, 174 A.2d 167 (1961). Subsequently in Dyson v. State, 238
Md. 398, 209 A.2d 609 (1965), the Brady-Thomas criteria were applied to admit a third party's
declaration that he in fact committed the rape for which the defendant was charged.
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conflicting confessions give rise to a need for the evidence in the
interests of justice. The Thomas court did not emphasize circum-
stances which guard against the fabrication of the third party's
declaration against penal interest.
There has been an obvious development in the Maryland rule.
It first evolved from the traditional exclusionary rule to the
Brennan-type special-circumstances rule which insures the trus-
tworthiness of the declaration. Next Maryland courts recognized
admissibility where there are conflicting declarations of criminal
liability, a situation giving rise to the need for the evidence. The
practical effect of this development is, when either special trustwor-
thiness or special need is present, the declaration against penal
interest should be admitted.
For purposes of defining the corroboration requirement of rule
804(b)(3), the Brennan case presents the following proposition:
where the witness has no motive to falsify, where the declarant had
an opportunity to commit the crime, and where the declarant's acts
subsequent to the crime indicate that a reasonable man would not
act in such a manner unless he committed the crime, then the
corroboration requirement is met and the declaration against penal
interest should be admitted to prove the truth of the facts therein
asserted. The analogy between Brennan and the federal rule is
founded in the emphasis of circumstances insuring trustworthiness
of the underlying facts asserted in the declaration. The other half
of the Maryland rule emphasizing need is crucial to an understand-
ing of the development of the various approaches to the special-
circumstances trend. But since the federal rule does not require
circumstances corroborative of need, the Thomas case has no appli-
cation. The analogy is confined to-Brennan.
Illinois Rule: Emphasis Primarily on Need
In People v. Lettrich,7 the court held that extrajudicial decla-
rations of a third party to the effect that he committed a crime are
hearsay. Even though such declarations were against interest, the
court held this evidence inadmissible except "where it is obvious
that justice demands a departure. 8
47. 413 11. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952).
48. Id. at 178, 108 N.E.2d at 492.
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But the special circumstances in.this case justified admission
of the declaration. The defendant alleged that his confession had
been coerced. The confession, substantially the only evidence
against the defendant, did not coincide with many of the known
facts. The effect of these circumstances was to cast doubt on the
veracity of the defendant's confession and ultimate guilt. Because
the situation presented a high risk of convicting an innocent man,
there was a special need for the second-hand evidence. On the issue
of admissibility, the court did not emphasize the trustworthiness of
the facts asserted in the third party's declaration against penal
interest.
Lettrich represents a distinct approach to the special-
circumstances trend because of its primary emphasis on need. As
such, it is important to a comprehensive examination of this trend.,
However, Lettrich is not relevant to the corroboration requirement
of rule 804(b)(3), since the federal rule does not require circumstan-
ces corroborative of need.
Virginia Rule: Emphasis Primarily on Trustworthiness
A Virginia police officer had been murdered in Hines v.
Commonwealth.'" A third party appeared to be as closely linked to
the crime as the accused. In fact, the third party was a bootlegger
wanted by the police. He had threatened the life of any officer who
tried to apprehend him. He owned a weapon of the same caliber as
the murder weapon. He was about the same size as the man seen
to run from the site of the crime. And he declared that he had killed
the officer. Recognizing that motive and opportunity provided a
sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness of the facts asserted, the
Hines court admitted the declaration against penal interest.
Subsequently in Newburry v. Commonwealth,5' the court held
49. In the subsequent case of People v. Dowling, 95 Ill. 2d 223, 238 N.E.2d 131 (1968),
the court did not find any special circumstances giving rise to a need of admissibility in the
interests of justice. The court apparently saw no danger of convicting an innocent man where
there was direct, unequivocal and unimpeached testimony of eyewitnesses to the defendant's
guilt. Similarly in People v. Moscatello, 112 Ill. 2d 16, 251 N.E.2d 532 (1969), the court found
no compelling circumstances where the declarant had a motive to falsify in order to avoid a
more serious prosecution and where the defendant was identified as the guilty party by
eyewitnesses.
50. 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923).
51. 191 Va. 445, 61 S.E.2d 318 (1950).
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it to be reversible error to exclude the written confession of a defen-
dant that would exonerate his codefendant. In this instance, two
witnesses could testify to the declaration. The declarant had both
an opportunity to commit the murder and a dislike for the deceased.
Applying the Hines special-circumstances test, the Newburry court
admitted the declaration against penal interest.
In both Hines and Newburry the effect of circumstances show-
ing the declarant's motive and opportunity was to increase the prob-
ability of the truthfulness of his declaration. Beyond this, the Vir-
ginia courts did not require a showing of special need for the evi-
dence. By analogy to the Virginia rule, whenever circumstances
corroborate motive and opportunity of the declarant, the test of
admissibility has been satisfied under rule 804(b)(3).
Strict Application of the Virginia Rule: Trustworthiness in Fact
Other states apply a stricter standard for admissibility than
that used by Virginia. In State v. Larsen,52 the Idaho court held,
• . . third-party confessions, made out of court, are admis-
sible only where there is other substantial evidence which
tends to show clearly that the declarant is in fact guilty of
the crime for which the accused is on trial.. . 3
The Larsen court affirmed a conviction for first-degree murder after
excluding the declaration of a third party who admitted the killing.
Under the less stringent Virginia rule, the requisite showing of
trustworthiness would have been met, and the admissibility of the
evidence may have resulted in a different verdict.
An examination of the circumstances in Larsen demonstrates
the special trustworthiness of the facts asserted in the declaration.
The declarant not only admitted the crime for which the defendant
52. 91 Idaho 42, 415 P.2d 685 (1966); State v. Sejuelas, 94 N.J. 576, 229 A.2d 659 (1967)
(applying the compelling-evidence test of admissibility prior to adoption of NEW JERSEY
STATUTES ANNOTATED 63(10)). See also State v. Fletcher, 240 Or. 295, 33 P. 575 (1893) (dic-
tum) (test for admissibility of third party declaration against penal interest is whether there
is compelling evidence connecting the defendant with the corpus delicti, i.e., a train of facts
or circumstances which clearly point to the declarant, rather than the defendant, as the guilty
party). This seems to confuse the distinction between admissibility of confessions and admis-
sibility of declarations against interest.
53. Id. at 49, 415 P.2d at 692.
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was subsequently convicted, but he also described in detail other
elements of the particular murder. His car and spare tire were spot-
ted with human blood, although no offer of proof was made to show
that it was the blood of the deceased. Weeds similar to those found
at the site of the grave were found on his car. He was off work and
had an opportunity to commit the murder. And prior to the killing,
he had had sexual relations with the victim, a pregnant and unmar-
ried girl. But the declaration was not admitted into evidence.
The Larsen case stands for the following proposition: the corro-
boration requirement is not met until compelling evidence clearly
demonstrates that the declarant was in fact the person guilty of the
crime. This test for admissibility certainly insures the truthfulness
of the declaration. But it takes little account of the need for such
declarations-the fear of losing all evidence of the declarant's guilt
at the risk of convicting an innocent man. For that reason, the
Larsen test is diametrically opposed to rule 804(b)(3), which as-
sumes a greater need for the evidence. The Larsen test places the
defendant in the role of prosecutor trying to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt the guilt of a third party. This effectively negates
the application of rule 804(b)(3) due to the inherent difficulty of
proving guilt in fact.54 Of course, some cases may present compelling
evidence of the third party's guilt. But as a minimum standard for
admissibility it is manifestly unfair. Thus, no analogy can be drawn.
54. Cf. Belvin v. United States, 273 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1960); Sells v. United States,
262 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1958) (corroboration of a confession need not in itself be sufficient
preponderately to establish guilt, and need not of itself establish the corpus delicti; but it is
required merely that the prosecution produce independent evidence sufficiently supporting
the essential admitted facts to justify a jury inference of the truth of the admitted facts or
tending to establish the trustworthiness of the statement, i.e., material proof of the offense
discovered as a result of the confession); Adams v. State, 32 Ala. 367, 26 So. 2d 216 (1946);
People v. Masse, 5 N.Y.2d 217, 182 N.Y.S.2d 821, 156 N.E.2d 452 (1959) (rape case holding
circumstantial evidence sufficient for corroboration purposes); People v. Imperiale, 14 Misc.
2d 887, 180 N.Y.S.2d 814 (Ct. Spec. Sess., Kings City 1957) (rape case holding that circum-
stantial evidence need not necessarily be such as to exclude every hypothesis except that of
guilt); People v. Elston, 186 App. Div. 224, 174 N.Y.S. 1 (1919) (rape case holding that
corroborating evidence need not be direct and positive or conclusive); Leckie v. Lynchburg
Trust and Say. Bank, 191 Va. 360, 60 S.E.2d 923 (1950); Burton's Ex'r. v. Manson, 142 Va.
500, 129 S.E. 356 (1925) (unnecessary that declaration be corrobarated in every particular or
that corroborative evidence itself be sufficient to support a verdict).
[Vol. 9
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 [1975], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol9/iss2/5
1975] DECLARATIONS AGAINST PENAL INTEREST 439
RECOMMENDATIONS
Given rule 804(b)(3), this author recommends that a showing
of any one corroborating circumstance noted in the special-
circumstances cases be sufficient as meeting the condition preced-
ent to admissibility. Thus, any of the following types of corroborat-
ing evidence should satisfy the trustworthiness standard: opportun-
ity, motive, or acts subsequent to the crime. Further, two poten-
tially troublesome factors should require no corroboration at all.
First, was the declaration in fact made? That is, did the declar-
ant actually say what he is alleged to have said? By analogy to well-
established law of confessions," this does not require corroboration.
It would be extremely difficult in most cases to find two witnesses
to whom the declarant made the statement against penal interest.
One willing witness should suffice, the corroborating circumstance
buttressing the probable truthfulness of the declaration.
The second factor which should not require corroboration is
whether the declarant has a motive to falsify. This inquiry is pro-
perly left either to the initial determination of whether the declara-
tion was against interest or to the later jury determination of credi-
bility and weight of evidence. Likewise, whether the witness has
motive to falsify is properly a jury determination of credibility, a
matter easily checked during cross-examination.
Many of the special-circumstances cases required more than
one corroborating circumstance. One may suspect that if an analogy
is valid between them and the federal rule, then the rule should also
require more than one corroborating circumstance. But those
special-circumstances cases which involved a showing of more than
one corroborating circumstance can easily be explained by looking
to the period in which they were decided. They were necessarily
more demanding since admissibility of statements against penal
interest was in direct conflict with the then-existing weight of au-
thority.5 But today the trend is toward a full recognition of the
55. Cash v. United States, 265 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1956), cert. denied 359 U.S. 973
(1959) (corroboration required to render a confession admissible is corroboration of truth or
trustworthiness of the confession and not co.roboration of fact that confession was made).
56. The court in Hines v. Commonwealth, 136 Va. 728, 117 S.E. 843 (1923) stated:
[W]e are disposed to think that the evidence of even a bare confession by a
deceased or unavailable witness ought to go to the jury for what they may consider
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inherent trustworthiness of declarations against penal interest.57
The rationale which admits declarations against pecuniary or
proprietary interests is logically being extended to include declara-
tions against penal interest. Although the federal rule is out of line
with this recognition, the pressures which previously may have com-
pelled higher degrees of corroboration no longer exist. In addition,
both the new trend and the federal rule agree on one fact: the need
for the evidence outweighs the danger of erroneous acquittals.
When the trial judge exercises his discretion on issues of admis-
sibility, weighing the various factors, it should be clear that one
corroborating circumstance suffices for purposes of justice. It is bet-
ter to free a guilty man than to convict an innocent one. This is
consistent with the underlying assumption of need embodied in rule
804(b)(3). And it is consistent with the idea that additional corro-
borating circumstances should go to the weight of proof rather than
its admissibility.
The distinction between burden of proof and admissibility is a
crucial one. It is absurd and unjust to place a defendant, faced with
potential incarceration, in the role of the prosecutor, trying to estab-
lish beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of a third party. A higher
requirement of corroboration is a perversion of the balancing-of-
interests test used for admissibility, a confusion of the issues of
admissibility and burden of proof, and a negation of the overriding
element of need assumed by rule 804(b)(3). Of course, the corrobor-
ation requirement will operate as a means of taking some evidence
away from the jury for fear that it will return an erroneous acquittal.
But a requirement that more than one corroborating circumstance
be shown demonstrates a mistrust of the jury which is inconsistent
with recent Supreme Court decisions which have stressed the funda-
mental role of the jury in the American system of justice.58
it worth; but as our decision here must be regarded as out of line with the current of
authority, we will expressly limit its effect as precedent in this court to the particular
facts of the case in hand.
Id. at 848.
57. See note 30 supra.
58. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (in most cases, juries understand the
evidence, properly evaluate it, and come to sound conclusions).
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CONCLUSION
Analysis of the corroboration requirement of rule 804(b)(3) re-
veals its distinguishing characteristic. It assumes an inherent need
for second-hand evidence. This need arises from the declarant's
unavailability and from the risk of convicting an innocent man. The
official comments state that the exclusive purpose of the corrobora-
tion requirement is to prevent fabrication.59 The effect of this pur-
pose is to insure the probability of the truth of facts underlying the
declaration. Consequently, corroboration of a special need for the
evidence is unnecessary. And the special-circumstances cases which
require combinations of need and trustworthiness are of substantial
value.
The initial basis for analogy between the corroboration require-
ment of rule 804(b)(3) and selected approaches to the special-
circumstances trend is the sameness of the underlying policies-(1)
that a declaration against penal interest is inherently unreliable,
but (2) that interests of justice create a need for the second-hand
evidence. The second basis for analogy is the similar emphasis on
circumstances insuring the trustworthiness of the facts asserted in
the declaration.
Due to the requirement of trustworthiness, selected approaches
to the special-circumstances trend can be condensed into proposi-
tions or guidelines for the application of the corroboration require-
ment of the federal rule. For instance, the following proposition can
be gleaned from the Texas rule: where the person making the decla-
ration is so situated that he might have committed the crime, then
the corroboration necessary for admissibility is satisfied. From the
Maryland either-or test, the Brennan case stands as precedent for
the following proposition: where the witness has no motive to falsify,
where the declarant had an opportunity to commit the crime, and
where the declarant's acts subsequent to the crime indicate that a
reasonable man would not act in such a manner unless he commit-
ted the crime, the corroboration requirement is satisfied. From the
Virginia rule, the Hines case stands for the following proposition:
where the third-party declarant is shown to have both motive and
59. See note 34 supra.
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opportunity to commit the particular crime asserted, then the corro-
boration- requirement is satisfied.
Although each of the three propositions requires circumstances
corroborative of the declarant's opportunity to commit the crime
asserted, none of the three propositions matches another in all of its
prerequisites to admissibility. Future decisions will demonstrate
which prerequisite or prerequisites to admissibility is determinative
for the newly enacted rule 804(b)(3).
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